

Lecturer: Dr. Alessandra Marra

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MCMP/ LMU Munich

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The Normativity of Logic

Seminar Description and Objectives

This seminar asks whether, and if so in which sense, logic is a normative discipline. We consider it to be a bad thing to hold inconsistent beliefs. And, similarly, we criticize others for failing to appreciate the logical consequences of their beliefs (Steinberger 2020). On the other hand, psychological results appear to show that ordinary agents systematically fail to comply with certain principles of classical logic. Moreover, it is argued, there are principles of classical logic, such as the Ex Falso Quodlibet, with which ordinary agents not only fail to comply, but also should fail to comply.

So, we ask: Do principles of logic tell us what we ought to believe and how we ought to reason? We will investigate this question by looking at contemporary articles in the philosophy of logic.

Seminar Structure and Evaluation

The seminar will consist of a round-table discussion of the relevant readings. Students are expected to have read the required readings before coming to the seminar and to participate actively in the discussion. At the end of each meeting, the lecturer will provide a short introduction to the topic that will be addressed in the following meeting.

The final grade is determined by the weighted average of the grades of: an in-class test (30%) + short essay (70%).

General Information

- Time: 12:00–14:00 cum tempore
- Location: in-person, room 021, Ludwigstr. 31.
- Lecturer: Alessandra Marra (Alessandra.Marra@lrz.uni-muenchen.de)
- You can address me as "Dr. Marra" or as "Alessandra".
- Please let me know if you have a preferred pronoun.
- Office hours: By appointment

Schedule

Please note that the schedule might be subject to change.

18.10 Introduction

Part 1: Harman's Challenges to Normativity, and Replies

25.10 *Harman's Challenges.*

Required Reading: Gilbert Harman: *Change in View: Principles of Reasoning* (1984), Chapters 1-2.

Further readings: David Christensen: *Putting logic in its place: formal constraints on Rational Belief*, Chapters 3-4 (2004).

08.11 *Mind the Gap: Variety of Bridge Principles.*

Required Reading: John MacFarlane: *In What Sense (If Any) Is Logic Normative for Thought?* (manuscript, available on the author's webpage)

Further readings: John Broome: *Normative requirements* (1999).

15.11 *Preface Paradox and the Probabilists' Move.*

Required Reading: Hartry Field: *What is the Normative Role of Logic?* (2009).

Further readings: David Makinson: *The Paradox of the Preface* (1965); Henry Kyburg: *Conjunctivitis* (1970); Hannes Leitgeb: *A way out of the preface paradox* (2014); Gilbert Harman: *Field on the Normative Role of Logic* (2009)

22.11 *Kinds of Normativity for Logic.*

Required Reading: Florian Steinberger: *Consequence and Normative Guidance* (2019).

Further reading: Florian Steinberger: *Three ways logic may be normative* (2019).

29.11 *Logic as Constitutive for Thinking.*

Required Readings: Manish Oza: *The Value of Thinking and the Normativity of Logic* (2020).

Further Readings: Jessica Leech: *Logic and the Laws of Thought* (2015).

Part 2: Monism, Pluralism, Normativity

06.12 *Deviant Logics: Paraconsistent Logic, Logical Monism, and Normativity.*

Required Readings: Graham Priest: *What Is so Bad about Contradictions?* (1998) **and** Graham Priest: *Logic: One or Many?* (2001) *only pp.1-5* (i.e., sections 1 and 2)

Further Readings: Graham Priest: *Revising Logic* (2014); Graham Priest: *Two Dogmas of Quineanism* (1979); Graham Priest: *Doubt Truth to be a Liar* (2006), Chapter 14; Stephen Read: *Monism: The One True Logic* (2006).

13.12 *Logical Pluralism and Normativity.*

Required Reading: Florian Steinberger: *Logical pluralism and logical normativity* (2019)

Further Readings: JC Beall and Greg Restall: *Logical Pluralism* (2000); Roy Cook: *Let a Thousand Flowers Bloom: A Tour of Logical Pluralism* (2010); Teresa Kouri Kissel & Stewart Shapiro: *Logical pluralism and normativity* (2017); Greg Restall: *Carnap's Tolerance, Language Change and Logical Pluralism* (2001); Erik Stei: *Rivalry, normativity, and the collapse of logical pluralism* (2020); Hartry Field: *Pluralism in Logic* (2009); Gillian Russell: *Logic Isn't Normative* (2017).

Part 3: Oughts of Rationality

20.12 *Rationality as Responding to Reasons*

Required Reading: Niko Kolodny: *How does Coherence Matter?* (2007) [feel free to skip the discussion on Means-ends coherence at pp. 250-253]

Further Readings: John Broome: *Rationality Through Reasoning* (2013); Niko Kolodny: *Why be disposed to be coherent?* (2008); Kenny Easwaran and Branden Fitelson: *Accuracy, Coherence and Evidence* (2015); Branden Fitelson: *Coherence* (manuscript). Sec. 5.1-5.2; Lara Buchak and Philip Pettit: *Reasons and Rationality* (2014); Diego Tajer: *The Normative Autonomy of Logic* (2020).

10.01 *Dialogical Rationality*

Required Readings: Catarina Dutilh Novaes: *A Dialogical, Multi-Agent Account of the Normativity of Logic* (2015) **and** excerpts from: Hugo Mercier and Dan Sperber: *Why Do Humans Reason? Arguments for an Argumentative Theory* (2011).

Further Readings: Sinan Dogramaci: *Communist Conventions for Deductive Reasoning* (2013); Hugo Mercier and Dan Sperber: *Bounded Reason in a Social World* (2021); Philipp Koralus and Salvador Mascarenhas: *The Erotetic Theory of Reasoning* (2013).

17.01 *Minimal Rationality*

Required Reading: Excerpts from: Christopher Cherniak: *Minimal Rationality* (1985) **and** Gerd Gigerenzer: *Fast and Frugal Heuristics: The Tools of Bounded Rationality* (2004), **and** Gerd Gigerenzer: *Axiomatic rationality and ecological rationality* (2021).

Further Readings: Gerd Gigerenzer: *The Bias Bias in Behavioral Economics* (2018); Rineke Verbrugge: *Logic and Social Cognition* (2009); Rineke Verbrugge and Lisette Mol: *Learning to Apply Theory of Mind* (2008).

Part 4: The Epistemology of Logic and its Place among the Sciences.

24.01 *The Justification of Deduction.*

Required Readings: Susan Haack: *The Justification of Deduction* (1976) **and** Lewis Carroll: *What the Tortoise Said to Achilles* (1895).

Further Readings: Michael Dummett: *The Justification of Deduction* (1974); Susan Haack: *Dummett's Justification of Deduction* (1982); Ole Thomassen Hjortland: Anti-exceptionalism about logic (2017); Suki Finn: The Adoption Problem and Anti-Exceptionalism about Logic (2019); Ole Thomassen Hjortland: What Counts as Evidence for a Logical Theory? (2019).

[31.01](#) Recap session

[07.02](#) In-class test